

CHAPTER 6

REGIONAL CONTRASTS WITHIN A CONTINENTAL-SCALE STATE: BRAZIL

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If one wants to go deeper into the study of a given political system, one should move from the analysis of the overall political system into the study of regional differences and subsystems; and the larger the population and geographical area covered by the national system, the more important this analysis becomes: the closer and deeper we look into something we are trying to understand, the better. The idea in this chapter however, goes much further than that. The proposition is that the analysis of regional subsystems, when properly performed, implies a profound theoretical shift of perspectives in such a way that the kind of knowledge acquired is not simply "better" than before, but qualitatively more adequate. The gain is not a simple matter of added knowledge, but of a new way of understanding.

This notion of a new theoretical approach stemming from an analysis of regional differentiations, with reference to the role of the state of São

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Paulo in the Brazilian national system has already been indicated by Warren Dean.¹ The idea was that it is impossible to consider São Paulo either as a "deviant" case in the national picture, or as a representative one of a "more advanced" stage of development in the country. Two facts suffice to illustrate this point. One is the weakness of the national political parties in the state of São Paulo during the 1945-1964 period, reflecting the relative marginality of the country's economic center regarding the national party system.² The other is the relative equilibrium between the processes of urbanization and industrialization, which the state underwent during this century. This condition differs markedly from urbanization without industrialization in other metropolitan areas of the country. To consider São Paulo a deviant case would explain away the historical role of the most important area of the country in terms of its economy and population; this action is obviously not acceptable. And there are no reasons to imagine that the present metropolitan areas of the country such as Rio, Belo Horizonte, Recife, and others, will eventually replicate the Paulista pattern of intensive industrialization leading to a process of urban concentration.

Nor is São Paulo the only deviant case. The state of Rio Grande do Sul, bordering Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, has historically played a political role in the national system quite out of proportion to its size and economic weight.³ Rio Grande do Sul is not a region of traditional politics based on local bonds and loyalties in a stagnant economy, held to be by many as the core of traditional Brazilian politics; it has never been a dominant economic pole, and was never the administrative center of the country. On the contrary, it is a frontier state, thousands of miles away from the country's capital, but this geographical marginality seemed to have placed the state in the very center of national politics from the beginning of the twentieth century on. The special role of Rio de Janeiro as the seat of the national government is probably easier to understand;

Rio de Janeiro, May, 1972, and is part of a broader study of the Brazilian political system in historical perspective. Earlier published papers include "Representação e Cooptação Política no Brasil," *Dados*, Vol. 7, 1971, and *Desarrollo Economico*, Vol. 41, 1971; "Veinte Años de Democracia Representativa en Brasil," *Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política*, 1971; and "Desenvolvimento e Abertura Política," *Dados*, Vol. 6, 1970. The emphasis has always been in the theoretical perspective, rather than in factual data. Excellent studies have recently come out on Brazilian regional history, and they provide the indispensable empirical reference for my interpretations. I am grateful to Antonio Octavio Cintra, Glaucio A. D. Soares, Gustavo Bayer, and Peter McDonough for suggestions, comments, and criticism, with the usual "no blame" clause.

the same applies to the state of Minas Gerais, which is closer to evincing what traditional politics is supposed to be, in historical terms.

We have, in short, at least four main regional actors in the political system which behave in quite different ways and have important but sometimes unexpected impact on the national system: the economic center (São Paulo), the urban and administrative center (Rio de Janeiro), the traditional countryside (Minas Gerais), and the frontier state (Rio Grande do Sul). To describe the theoretical framework of their interaction is the objective of this chapter.⁴

STATE AND SOCIETY

Stein Rokkan has presented us with a highly sophisticated and complex framework for the study of nation-building and the development of political and party cleavages in Western Europe.⁵ It would probably be unwise to apply his whole analytical framework directly to the study of the Brazilian political system; but it will be essential to bear it in mind as we try to unfold the variables that characterize Brazil's regional differences and national integration process in a more inductive and, as it were, "natural" way.

The point of departure is the classic distinction between state and society. It is well known today that there are substantial differences in the meanings of the word "state" in the Anglo-Saxon and other intellectual traditions; these differences reflect real historical differences, and explain the relative "statelessness" of Anglo-Saxon political theory. J. P. Nettl has argued in favor of using the "variable degree of stateness" as a central variable in cross-national studies;⁶ Reinhardt Bendix, in an earlier paper, made a similar suggestion.⁷

The essential idea is that the state is not only a concept referring to the integration and sovereignty of a given population in a given territory—in which case the notion of different levels or degrees of stateness would be meaningless—but is also a specific institution within a country which not only performs the functions of boundary maintenance and sovereignty, but can also be smaller or bigger, stronger or weaker, independent or controlled by other social groups and institutions. In other words, there is here a shift from a functional to a more structural perspective, that is, the state is considered an institution endowed with a changing structure of its own.

Both Bendix and Nettl place these different conceptions of the state in historical and theoretical perspectives. Bendix emphasizes the existence of

two main approaches in political theory since Machiavelli. The first and older of these approaches is Machiavelli's own: he thought of political facts and events as functions of the abilities and virtues of the political leader, the prince. Generally speaking, this tradition leads to a perception of the state as a unit that organizes the wills and aspirations of the society as a whole, defining and working towards its goals. The ruler is not responsive to the ruled, whereas the social structure seems to offer no resistance to the prince: the only limitations to his will are his own fancy and wit. This conception, of course, is an extreme that has the absolutist state as its implicit empirical reference.

The other theoretical tradition stems from Rousseau: the power of the state is delegated by the population and the state must act in accordance with an explicit and well-limited social contract. The idea of a social contract has an ideological and normative meaning, since it appeared in the struggle against Absolutism; but it also has sociological value in that it is an empirical statement on how politics is performed when social groups are strong and the government is weak. The contractualist notion of the state was equivalent to a Copernican revolution in political thought, leading to a shift in perspective which in turn quite often led to the very annihilation of the state as an autonomous variable worthy of the political analyst's attention. As a matter of fact, in this extreme view, the state is nothing but the locus through which the dominant groups or classes exercise their will: it has no political texture of its own.

As seen through the criticism that Marx addresses to his *Philosophy of Law*,⁸ it is Hegel who opens the way for the analysis of the relationships between the state and civil society as separate and often contradictory structures. Hegel distinguishes between civil society, which is the state of necessity, and the state, which represents the general will, the unity of political life. More specifically, civil society is for Hegel the "phenomenon" of the state, while the state is the "idea" of society. The idea is incorporated in the sovereign and the constitution, and the mediation between the idea and society is performed by several intervening institutions, such as public opinion, the representation of civilian groups in the state, the bureaucracy, and so on.⁹

One of the main points of Marx's criticism is the stress he places on the private character of bureaucracy. For Hegel, bureaucracy is the soul of the state, and the private activities of civil servants perform a universal function. In Marx's opinion, however, the bureaucrat ends up making this universal function his private business. For Hegel, bureaucracy has as its first assumption the autonomy and organization of civil society in private corporations. The choice of civil servants and public authorities is

conceived as a mixed choice, initiated in the private sector and approved by the sovereign. The fact is, says Marx, that this kind of penetration by civil society into the state leads to nothing but the creation of another kind of private corporation, the bureaucracy:

The corporations are the materialism of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy is the spiritualism of the corporations; but the corporation is the bureaucracy of civil society, and the bureaucracy is the corporation of the state.

And later on:

The bureaucracy keeps in its power the being of the State, the spiritual being of society: it is its *private property*. The general spirit of the bureaucracy is its *mystery*; this mystery is kept inside the bureaucracy by its hierarchy, and kept from the outside because the bureaucracy has the characteristics of a private corporation. To make the spirit of the State known to everybody is thus perceived by the bureaucracy as a treason to its mystery. The principle of the bureaucratic science is thus the *authority*, and the *idolatry* of authority its *sentiment*. Kept within the bureaucracy, this *spiritualism* becomes a *sordid materialism*, the materialism of passive obeisance, of faith in authority, of the *mechanism* of fixed formal activities, of fixed principles, ideas and traditions. For the bureaucrat taken as an individual, the goals of the State become his private goal, which is the *hunting for higher positions, the push in the way up*.

This notion of a bureaucracy with private interests includes, of course, the conception of the state as the political arm of a given social class, but it is more general than that. Nettl discusses this notion in some length, and shows how

Marx partially lost interest in the problem of the state when he moved intellectually as well as physically from Europe to England and when, in writing *Das Kapital*, he concentrated on the much more "English" analysis of economic forces and consequent class relations rather than on the problems of ideological consciousness and revolution in a state-dominated Europe.¹¹

Bendix shows how Machiavelli himself recognized the existence of two types of government, one carried on by "the Prince and his servants" and the other by "the Prince and by Barons."¹² While, in the first type, the prince is the only source of power, in the latter there are rights of political influence that are obtained through heritage and do not depend on the prince's favor. This second type of political power characterizes a state of equilibrium between the central power and what would later be called "civil society"; each has some autonomy of decisions and initiative, and tries to limit and direct the behavior of the other. The fact that the barons are just a tiny group of aristocrats is less important, theoretically, than the notion that their sources of power do not come from the prince.

Once this duality of power sources is established, it expands and

differentiates in several directions. What is important is the idea that this is not a simple matter of functional differentiation, in which the state performs the political functions of vertical authority and domination, while the barons retain the horizontal functions of solidarity interest aggregation, and articulation. What happens, in fact, is that aggregation and articulation of private interests are carried on within the structures of authority, while systems of authority develop in the "private" sector of society and reach towards the control of the state. The actual balance between these two tendencies varies, and has to be determined empirically. The more significant theoretical point here is that the characteristics of a given state's structure cannot be fully deduced from the characteristics of its civil society (or, in contemporary terms, its class structure), just as society cannot be fully understood from the formal characteristics of its governmental organization.

PATRIMONIALISM AND THE GROWTH OF THE STATE

In the contractual model, the government does not have power of its own; it acts by delegation and with resources provided by civil society. In fact, as demonstrated in Marx's criticism of Hegel's *Theory of Law*, the organization that performs this delegation develops private resources and private interests. This development occurs when the state acts by delegation of the whole society, as well as when it behaves more or less clearly as "the instrument" of a given class. One of the reasons for this occurrence is, of course, the sheer growth and differentiation of the government. From the theoretical role of a simple gendarme and mediator, the stateless state of the nineteenth century referred to by Nettl develops into a giant that makes the simple interest group approach to political analysis little more than an historical relic. E. E. Schattschneider stressed this point very strongly:

While we were looking the other way, the government of the United States became a global operation a decade or two ago. The budget is about two hundred fifty times as large as it was seventy years ago . . . In a purely formal sense we can say that the government of the United States is the same one that was established in 1789—in about the same way in which Henry Ford's bicycle repair shop is the same as the Ford Motor Company today.¹³

What is more remarkable about the American system is not so much this development in itself, as the fact that it did not lead to a more thorough annihilation of independent power sources. American liberalism, according to one of its critics, Theodore J. Lowi, means just the opposite, since it leads to the privatization of the public sector.

Referring to the agricultural sector, for instance, Lowi sees it as an extreme case of "private expropriation of public authority." "This is the feudal pattern," he continues; "fusion of all statuses and functions and governing through rigid but personalized fealties. In modern dress, that was the corporativistic way."¹⁴ The difference between this neocorporativism of the liberal state and the corporative state as such is that, in the latter, the state behaves explicitly and legitimately on behalf of a group that has control of the state apparatus as the basis, rather than as the instrument, of its social, economic, and political power.

The idea of economic power based on the state, and not the opposite (that is, political power based on economic resources), is difficult to accept in stateless political theories, and this difficulty helps to explain the odyssey of the "Asian mode of production" in Marxian literature.¹⁵ As it appears in the relatively recently rediscovered *Grundrisse*,¹⁶ this concept applies to some precapitalist forms of economic organization, which are characterized by the partial or total nonexistence of private property, or at least by the existence of a predominant public sector in the economy:

Etant le véritable propriétaire et la véritable condition de la propriété collective, l'unité peut elle-même sembler *distincte* et au-dessus de la multitude des communautés particulières: l'individu est alors, en fait, sans propriété.¹⁷

Marx distinguishes two subtypes of these precapitalist forms, one which is generally based on the large-scale organization of rural economies, usually through nationally integrated systems of water irrigation works, and others based instead on urban centers, where:

La guerre est donc la grande tâche collective, le grand travail commun, exigés soit pour s'emparer des conditions matérielles d'existence, soit pour défendre et perpétuer l'occupation.¹⁸

There is no need to go further into the expanding debate that still revolves around the concept of "Asiatism." It is enough to keep in mind that this type of economic and political organization does not fit the evolutionary model that goes from slavery to serfdom to wage labor and capitalism, a model in which the interest group politics concept belongs, and a model that is more or less implicit in the stateless theories of social development.¹⁹ It is a fact that the Western States that attained high levels of development during this century have more or less followed that pattern, and there is a high correlation between a decentralized and feudallike system in the past and high economic development in this century. "Hydraulic societies," bureaucratic and centralized empires of the past, were way above medieval Europe, according to almost any standards of development, but they did not seem to be able to adapt themselves to

modern industrial society, while countries with a feudal past (the only one in Asia that comes close to it being Japan) were much more able to adopt modern and efficient forms of economic organization. Thus—contrary to what is sometimes held—feudalism does not seem to have been a factor of underdevelopment, but on the contrary, it was its absence, and the dominance of a bureaucratized and overgrown state, which seemed to have been one of its determinants. Having arrived late to a world developed through capitalist initiative, these countries have only their own inflated states to bring them to the world of industrial development.²⁰

CLEAVAGES IN PATRIMONIAL STATES

The concept of "patrimonialism" acquires its full characterization in Max Weber, who refers to a type of traditional domination where the government "is an extension of the ruler's household." It is essential to recall that this concept is used as an alternative to another major type of traditional domination, feudalism.²¹ There are a few characteristics of patrimonialism which lead more or less directly to the political cleavages that are bound to appear in states with this type of domination.

First, patrimonial states tend to be urban-based and to develop urban civilizations. These urban centers can be either the capital of an empire, or a city-state with trade and military interests abroad. These centers tend to have a sizable floating population, and an aristocracy that has to be fitted somehow into the governmental bureaucracy. The first political problem of patrimonial states is keeping the urban masses content, and keeping the government jobs open to the urban aristocracy.

Second, there is the classic tension between the ruler and its officers:

All patrimonial states of the past have involved a pattern of decentralization that has been determined by the struggle for power between the ruler and his retainers and officers.²²

As the patrimonial realm grows, so grows the need to delegate power and authority, and at the same time the feasibility of central control is reduced. Moreover, retainers of patrimonial delegation tend to receive their posts as political prebends, and to use them as their private property. When the patrimonial state is based on military conquest and occupation, this pattern leads to the development of private, or praetorian military bodies, which have more loyalty to their own captains than to the ruler. When the patrimonial state is based on agriculture, regional atomization occurs and semiautonomous satraps emerge.

The third type involves a pattern of continuous belligerency between the patrimonial state and other states at its borders. It is reasonable to suppose, in fact, that military occupation and direct exploitation are simply extreme cases of patrimonial military expansion. The history of the old empires, including the Roman Empire, shows a clear pattern of expansion that includes, first, military occupation, looting, and enslavement of part of the local population and afterwards, the establishment of some kind of federation between conqueror and conquered, very often maintaining the local ruling class in its positions. The rationale for this arrangement is obvious, since the maintenance of the local economic and political structure assures a continuous flow of revenue towards the patrimonial state, through levies and taxes of all kinds, which cannot be kept flowing in predatory conquests. The maintenance of this kind of local autonomy means that some power remains outside the state, and that tensions and conflicts are bound to arise.

A not altogether different situation occurs when some forms of autonomous activity emerge within the patrimonial dominion, with or without the ruler's consent and intention. One pattern here is the emergence of some industry or agriculture for the foreign market, which is heavily taxed by the state. The state stimulates this activity, but at the same time functions as a parasite that limits and eventually kills autonomous activity. This situation is different from the patrimonial state in the hydraulic type of society, where the government plays an active role in the organization and administration of the economy. Here, all the initiative comes from the private sphere, and the role of the state is almost purely fiscal. In absolutist Europe, this process was evidenced in the emergence of strong trade and industrial centers, which paralleled the progressive decay of feudal power. Eventually, it led to the emergence of bourgeois aspirations and values that brought about the destruction of the patrimonial state. Actually, in his analysis of Weber's theories on the emergence of legal rationality, Bendix shows that

in western Europe patrimonial power eventually promoted the formal rationality of law and administration, and this conflicts with the tendency of patrimonial rulers to promote substantive justice and personal favoritism."

This process is explained by Weber, as are other things, as a consequence of the central government's need to restrain the power pretensions of vassals and officeholders. This restraint was accomplished through the establishment of a "centrally-controlled officialdom," and "in the struggle against the entrenched position of the states, patrimonial rulers were frequently supported by the rising bourgeoisie."²³

It is fairly clear from the foregoing discussion that patrimonialism of the Western European kind, as it existed in the absolutist regimes, was very different from other versions. The main difference lies in the fact that Western European patrimonialism was strengthened together with the emergence of the bourgeoisie; at the end of the process, the system of legal domination, inherited by the absolutist regimes, was mostly contractual and most suited to modern capitalism. It would certainly be possible to trace the differences between state and stateless societies, suggested by Nettl, back to the varying balances between bourgeois and patrimonial powers in the struggle against the remains of the feudal, corporatist society. It is remarkable how Weber himself does not seem to have elaborated on the structural conditions that could explain the differences in legal rationality and authority between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental European countries. These differences are minimal, nevertheless, when compared with the states that changed from an original patrimonial system to a modern centralized state without the mediation of a bourgeois revolution. These states are certainly able to modernize and rationalize their bureaucracies, but their power bases and political systems must necessarily be quite different from those of the Western democracies. And these make up, of course, the bulk of today's non-Western countries.

A FOURFOLD REGIONALIZATION

The previous discussion presents a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the four types of Brazilian regions suggested at the beginning. The gap between the theoretical discussion and the Brazilian case can now be covered by showing how Brazilian regions belong to a more general type, a species related to the historical presence of a patrimonial state.

That Portugal did not fit the classic European type of feudal organization seems fairly established among historians:

[Portuguese] nobility, according to Antonio de Souza, never plunged its roots in the countryside, nor had it ever had a civilizing, directive and protective role for the local population; it was rather a parasite living off the population and the central power.²⁴

Power was concentrated in the House of Avis, and this fact helps to explain the remarkable entrepreneurial push that fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Portugal showed. The centralized, bureaucratic, and patrimonial structure of government was transplanted in Brazil, first with the establishment of the General Government in 1548, and much later with

the migration of the whole Portuguese court to Rio in 1808.²⁵ Made independent in 1822 by a member of the Portuguese royalty, the line of continuity was never completely broken, and this fact is important for an understanding of the stable institutionalization of the Brazilian government during the colonial period, and later, in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is worth noting that prior to the establishment of the General Government in 1548, a system of feudallike captaincies was promoted, without success. These captaincies were to be transmitted from father to son, and the Portuguese Crown had to buy one of them back when the General Government was to be created.²⁶ The system of captaincies did not work out, the historians say, but two of them enjoyed some success. One was Pernambuco, where the sugar culture flourished as the colony's main product during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The other was São Vicente, later known as the Province and State of São Paulo.

This brief overview sketches three of our main region types. One of these is the government capital, which at first was Salvador, and later Rio de Janeiro. This is the country's most modern area: it has more direct contact with European life, and its culture and consumption are more conspicuous. This also tended to be an area of marginal population and underemployment. According to the 1890 Census of Rio de Janeiro, for instance, about 50 percent of its employees were in "domestic services" or had "undeclared professions." Race was obviously a related factor since slavery had been abolished only two years earlier. But the differences are not that great: 76 percent of the blacks and 53 percent of the mulattoes were in this group, but also 43 percent of the whites, which represented 62.5 percent of the whole "employed" population.²⁷ This mass of marginal population was certainly a nuisance for the elite that had to reckon with them occasionally when they became restless.²⁸ Usually, however, Rio presented a picture of popular politics and mass participation which had little to do with how things were really decided. In this sense it did not differ much from the other administrative capitals of nonindustrial societies. Its economic resources were derived from trade and governmental employment, and its political life was characterized by some degree of tension between the urban bureaucrats and tradesmen on the one hand, and a dependent regional gentry on the other, with occasional mobilization of the populace. Election turnout never went above five percent of the total population before 1930; this fact gives us the overall pattern of political participation.

Nineteenth and early twentieth-century Rio de Janeiro can be broadly described as a preindustrial city. This concept was used by Gideon Sjoberg

to characterize the urban structures that developed, according to him, in feudal societies where industrial development had not yet begun. In a footnote, Sjoberg tries to reduce the difference between European and non-European preindustrial towns:

Henri Pirenne, in *Medieval Cities*, and others have noted that European Cities grew up in opposition to and were separate from the greater society. But this thesis has been overstated for Medieval Europe. Most industrial cities are integral parts of broader social structures.²⁹

The main difficulty with the preindustrial city notion is, of course, the theory of unilinear development which it implies, and which takes the feudal system as the sole predecessor of modern societies. This point is made in a rebuttal to Sjoberg's book by Oliver C. Cox,³⁰ who states that even in medieval Europe the cities developed outside the feudal structure; Cox considers that Sjoberg's preindustrial city notion is little more than a residual concept.

Cox's criticism of Sjoberg's argument is convincing, but has little to offer as an alternative. The best theoretical clue, not surprisingly, is to be found in Max Weber, with his difference between occidental vs. oriental city.³¹ For him,

the residence of the ruler or of any administrative body being the focal point for the whole country or region is the most important feature in the structure and functioning of oriental cities.

In contrast, occidental cities are endowed with "corporate autonomy and autocephaly."³² The theoretical consequences of these differences are manifold, and have to do with differences in social stratification, the role of the army, the existence of autonomous economic activities, education, and so on. These differences are not, of course, a matter of geography, but have to do with the differences between the patrimonial and the feudal variants of traditional domination. City politics in Rio de Janeiro was most certainly "local," in the sense that its bearing on national events was minimal; but the same cannot be said of the politics of its elite, which was eminently national.

The second region is the so-called "traditional" reverse of the bureaucratic and urban capital. Brazilian traditional regions have little in common with what appears as traditionalism in the standard literature on underdevelopment and modernization. This literature usually takes as traditional those peasant or otherwise nonindustrial societies that suffer the impact of modernization and industrialization.³³ These traditional societies are supposedly in a primitive stage of social and economic development, and the corresponding sociological literature deals with the

cultural, emotional, and social obstacles to modern values, life-styles, and patterns of behavior.³⁴

In Brazil, as in some other countries, traditional areas are not those that have not modernized, but, on the contrary, tend to be areas that have had a period of progress in the past, and then suffered a process of economic decay. The old sugar culture area of the Northeast and the former mining areas of Minas Gerais are probably the best example of Brazilian traditionalism: both have a past of wealth and national economic preeminence. One of the most obscure, but more interesting questions about Brazilian economic and political history is what happens with these areas when they lose their export capabilities and recede into the shadow of history.³⁵ In the case of Minas Gerais, the exhaustion of the mining activities by the second half of the eighteenth century left the province with the largest population in the country, mostly centered in urban settlements, and with no major economic activity of high profitability.³⁶ The other thing that remained was, most probably, the bureaucratic structure of the Portuguese administration, and this administration was certainly the means through which the political vocation of the Minas Gerais elite was born.

V. O. Key's *Southern Politics* is probably the best description of a political system that survives a process of political decay—in this case, the period after the South's defeat in the Civil War. (The eleven states studied by Key are also those of the Southern Confederacy.) He shows that these studies have at least one common trait with the Brazilian states of the Old Republic, namely the one-party system. Key's analysis of the behavior of Southern senators suggests a very consistent pattern: they unite whenever the state's autonomy is at stake, whenever the racial status quo is threatened, and whenever the national Democratic government needs their support. The arrangement is fairly clear: the Southern Democrats support the government in exchange for control in their own states. In spite of these well defined patterns, Southern politics is usually "issueless," since even the racial question tends not to be raised. One-party systems, oligarchic control of the state political machinery, little popular participation, large rural properties in a decaying economy—all these similarities with traditional Minas Gerais are not purely coincidental. The main difference, of course, is that while the Confederate states had been defeated by the industrialized North, in Brazil the political hegemony of the industrial center was never the case.³⁷

The smallest unit in traditional politics of this kind is the local community in the countryside, where the local chieftain (in Brazil, the coronel) exerts his power. A sizeable portion of Brazilian political

literature has been devoted to examining the patterns of political traditionalism at the grass roots.³⁸ The most successful theoretical attempts are those that interpret local and regional political preeminence as a function of the brokerage roles played by the political leaders among local, state, and national governments.³⁹ It is important to note that this interpretation does not imply that the control of the land, family ties, loyalties, and personal allegiances did not have a role to play. All of these traditional elements were certainly present in different degrees, but they worked in a context of economic decay and predominance of bureaucratic government at the state and national level.

The third region, represented by São Paulo, shows most important differences. Since the very beginning of the country's history, the former captaincy of São Vicente developed independently of central administration. São Vicente was the first settlement that moved from the coast to the hinterland, in open contradiction of the general settlement policy of the Portuguese Crown.⁴⁰ The history of the expansion of São Vicente includes Indian hunting expeditions that penetrated further and further south, resulting in a military clash with the Spanish Jesuit Missions; expeditions in search of gold and gems, until the clash over the mining areas with other immigrants from Rio and the north during the Emboabas War;⁴¹ and a conspicuous absence of the Province of São Paulo from the first front of national events until the explosion of the coffee plantation in the nineteenth century.

This chapter is not the place for a history of the spectacular development of São Paulo from the late nineteenth century onwards, nor for the area's political role in the national picture. It is enough to recall that, after the 1940 census, it was the largest Brazilian state in terms of population, and it had for a long time been the main source of taxes for the central government and the center of the country's industrialization. Politically, São Paulo has been less important than its size and economic weight would suggest; and, in 1932, it was the last Brazilian state to rise in arms against the central government.⁴²

This pattern of relationships between administrative and economic centers is not a Brazilian peculiarity; it is a more general phenomenon shared by those countries that experienced some development in the setting up of a strong patrimoniallike state.

Juan Linz finds in Spain the same paradox that we find in Brazil:

Paradoxically, in the recent history of Spain, the most developed regions have felt alienated from the nation-state. Having "economic power" and well-being, they felt, rightly or wrongly, deprived of "political power."⁴³

TABLE 1
SPAIN: BARCELONA AND MADRID

	"Bourgeois" Spain (Barcelona)	Madrid
Population 1960	24.20%	7.67%
Per Capita Income (national average = 100)	164	131
Recruitment of Cabinet Members of Franco Regime ^a	.85	6.25
Judges (1958) ^a	.58	3.24
University Professors ^a	.95	2.87

SOURCE: Juan Linz, "The Eight Spains," in R. L. Merritt and S. Rokkan, *Comparing Nations*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1966.

a. Ratio of the proportion born in each "Spain" and the proportion of the population living there in 1910 (taken as a date close to the birth year of the elites).

The differences between Madrid and Barcelona, as expressed in Table 1, are strikingly similar to those we could find between Rio and São Paulo (see Table 2).

Italy seems to be another case in point, with differences among the industrial northern area, the urban and administrative center, and the rural south, as can be seen in Table 3.

A. F. Organski is aware of the regional discontinuities in Italy, and links the emergence of Fascism with them:

Some regions modernize faster and further than others because of advantages in resources, available skills, communications with the outside world, or other

TABLE 2
BRAZIL: REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN FOUR STATES
(in percentages)

	Population (1970)		Income			
	Urban	Total	From Industry	From Agriculture	From Public Sector	Total Income
São Paulo	27.3	19.0	56.8	19.5	23.5	35.3
Minas Gerais	11.7	12.3	7.5	12.2	8.3	10.0
Rio de Janeiro (Guanabara)	8.2	4.6	9.7	0.6	25.2	11.4
Rio Grande do Sul	6.8	7.1	5.9	12.6	8.9	8.5
Sum of Four States	54.0	43.0	79.9	44.9	65.9	65.2
Brazil	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Fundação IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Estatística, *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil*, 1971.

TABLE 3
**ITALY: RESIDENT FAMILIES BY BRANCH OF ECONOMIC
 ACTIVITY OF THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY AND
 REGIONS (in percentages)**

Regions	Population	Number of Families with Head of Family Working in:		
		Industry	Agriculture	Other Activities
Settentrionale	44.8	56.5	35.5	47.1
Centrale	18.5	17.5	16.0	22.4
Meridionale	24.5	18.0	31.8	20.2
Insulare	12.2	8.0	16.7	10.3
Total	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Calculated from Instituto Centrale de Statistica, *Compendio Statistico Italiano*, Rome, 1971, pp. 21 and 28-29.

reasons. Some nations modernize politically and remain backward economically. Other nations are highly urban before they are economically developed or politically modern . . . In the degree of symmetry and the degree of continuity in the changes of these three sets of variables (social, economic and political modernization) lies a very large portion—certainly a major portion—of the explanation for the appearance of fascist systems, the duration of their tenure, the variation in fascist political attitudes and behavior, and the manner and timing of the termination of the system.⁴⁴

The assumption of unequal, but nevertheless unilinear development is probably the main weakness of this notion. Indeed, if "no nation develops in such a fashion that all regions and all aspects of national life keep in step with all the rest," it remains to be explained why only a few of these nations fall in the fascist pattern of political organization. The fact is that the differences are not just a matter of varying regional and functional rates of growth, but mostly a question of regional structural differentiation that the imbalances of development reflect.

The fourth region is Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost state in the country. Its history starts with the establishment of the Portuguese colony of Sacramento at the border of the Río de la Plata; an attack by the Spanish governor of Buenos Aires followed almost immediately. During most of the eighteenth century the region was the main point of friction between the Portuguese and the Spanish empires in America. After Brazil's independence, the military nature of the province remained because of the conflicts between Brazil and Argentina concerning the control of what is today Uruguay, as well as because of the separatist revolutionary movements in Rio Grande, which always involved dealings with Argentine and Uruguayan rulers and *caudillos*.⁴⁵

Stein Rokkan has captured an important aspect of European nation-building which to some extent parallels the process that Rio Grande underwent. He shows essentially two types of city-states developing in Europe:

The Swiss and Dutch confederations were essentially defensive in character: there was no strong conquest centre . . . but a network of strategically placed cities willing to pool their resources in defense of their trading privileges.⁴⁶

To these typical, occidental cities, he opposes another type, developed "at the edges" of the Old Roman Empire. "Paradoxically," he says, "the history of Europe is one of centre formation at the periphery." More specifically:

These power centers at the southeastern and northeastern corners of the territories of the Roman Church built up crusading frontier empires against the rival world region of the South. This helps to explain the very close symbiosis of Church and State in these empires: the military might of the State was a decisive instrument in the struggle for the expansion of Western Christendom . . . The Iberian empires brought the same fervour of orthodoxy across the ocean to the New World: the conquest of Latin America produced an even stronger fusion of religious, political and economic institutions.⁴⁷

As in a system of Chinese boxes, Rio Grande seemed to have played in Brazil the same role that Portugal and Spain did in Christian Europe: as a frontier military outpost, it developed its own orthodoxy, Positivism—a peculiar combination of military tradition and cattle-raising culture—and a strong state oligarchy that gathered strength for the fights against the Spanish and porteño enemy for autonomy regarding the Brazilian Empire. The region was (and still is) the basis for the most important wing of the Brazilian army, and furnished a sizeable part of its cadres. It played a very active role in national politics since the creation of the *Partido Republicano Riograndense* in 1822, during the military overthrow of the Empire in 1889, and thereafter. It came to national power in 1930 with Vargas, governor of Rio Grande in behalf of the state boss, Borges de Medeiros; with Vargas, the *gauchos* literally hitched their horses in the national capital.⁴⁹ Vargas came to power again in 1950, Goulart in 1961, Costa e Silva and Médici after 1964: all these gaucho presidents testify to Rio Grande's remarkable vocation for national power, either through its civilian or its military sons.

This outline is too short to account for other important aspects of Rio Grande's role in Brazilian history. It would be important to take into account the state's internal cleavages, and its special economic role as a supplier of goods to the national market, as well as the importance that early European migration to the state had on the development of a highly

productive agricultural system.⁴⁹ But the fact seems to remain that Rio Grande's political role at the national level has much more to do with its military, caudillo, revolutionary, and oligarchic traditions than with the modern and European-like aspects of its economy and society.

CONCLUSION

Granting that the fourfold regionalization suggested here is relevant to the study of Brazilian political history, one might still wonder about its usefulness in the analysis of future outcomes in Brazilian politics.

The Brazilian political picture suffered a drastic change after 1945, with the granting of political suffrage to the entire adult literate population. The system of mass politics that emerged after 1945 was superimposed upon the regional cleavages, creating a rather complex pattern that I analyze elsewhere.⁵⁰ To the cleavage between the patrimonial and the capitalist areas of national politics, and the cleavages among center, periphery, and frontier in the patrimonial state, another cleavage, involving issues of popular participation, was added. Basically, two dominant types of political participation emerged: one along the Minas-Rio axis, the other in the industrial areas of the country. The first was what can be called a "cooptation system," which was defined as a system of political participation in which governmental positions are sought not so much as resources for implementing sectoral interests, but rather as a means of social mobility in themselves. The second was closer to the classic concept of interest-group politics. There are rural and urban, as well as capitalist and working-class cleavages in each of these systems, making the number of possible combinations quite high. I believe that the regional context for the emergence of mass politics in Brazil is an essential clue to the understanding of this experience of representative democracy, if one intends to go deeper than what the simple concepts of modernization, mobilization, massification, or radicalization would allow.

Furthermore, the correct understanding of the 1945-1964 system is indispensable if predictions about the political future of the country are to be made. It is clear, for instance, that this discussion shows the naiveté of expecting a new party system to emerge in Brazil in terms of interest group representation. The present restrictions on political activity in the country cannot be taken as a simple consequence of the ideological preferences of the government; rather they should be seen as the development of an historical tradition of governmental centralization and weak autonomous organizations. This view means that, if the restrictions

on political participation and mobilization are lifted, any workable political arrangement will have to be based on newly created forms of political organization, more in accordance with the realities of the country, and less as a function of the old-fashioned, interest-group imagery. Once the search for these new forms begins, a correct view of the history of political cleavages in the country will be indispensable.

NOTES

1. For the Role of São Paulo in the Brazilian political and economic systems, especially before 1945, see Warren Dean, *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880-1945*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1969, and my discussion in "Representação e Cooptação, Política no Brasil," *Dados*, Vol. 7, 1971.

2. See Simon Schwartzman, "Veinte Años de Democracia Representativa en Brasil," *Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política*, Vol. 11, No. 1, April 1971.

3. For the role of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazilian regional politics, see Joseph L. Love, *Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1971. For a scholarly account of the social and political fabric of Rio Grande do Sul in the nineteenth century, see F. H. Cardoso, *Capitalismo e Escravidão no Brasil Meridional*, São Paulo, Difusão Europeia do Livro, 1962.

4. It is important to notice that I am leaving Bahia and Pernambuco out of the picture: these states were national political and economic centers in the colonial period, but have suffered a marked process of political "atimie." I am assuming that they fall in the traditional pattern typified by Minas Gerais, but this assumption is certainly a simplification that should only be accepted with caution.

5. See Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building, A Possible Paradigm," in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (forthcoming under the sponsorship of the Committee on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council); and "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: an Introduction" (with S. M. Lipset) in S. Rokkan and S. M. Lipset, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, New York, Free Press, 1967. Charles Tilly has suggested an extremely interesting framework for the analysis of Western European nation-building which is within the same perspective. Cf. "Reflections on the History of European Statemaking" and "Postscript: Western Statemaking and Theories of political Development," in Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*.

6. See J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics*, Vol. XX, No. 4, 1968, pp. 559-92.

The relative "statelessness" of American social science coincides with the relative statelessness of the United States, with the long period during which the egalitarian and pluralistic society predicted with sensitive fingertips by Tocqueville was becoming institutionalized over a vast continent. One has only to read Lipset or Mitchell to see that an American socio-political self-examination simply leaves no room for any valid notion of state..

7. Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and the Political Community," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status and Power*, New York, Free Press, 1966.

8. Cf. G. W. Hegel, *Principes de la Philosophie du Droit*, trans. by Andre Kaan, Paris, Gallimard, 1940, especially after p. 255.

9. I am following here the discussion of Jean Hippolyte, *Etudes sur Marx et Hegel*, Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1965, which refers to the classic work of G. Luckacz on the young Hegel.

10. This extract is a free translation of the French version of the "Critique de la Philosophie d'Etat de Hegel," in K. Marx, *Oeuvres Philosophiques*, Vol. 4, Paris, Molitor, p. 103.

11. See Nettl, op. cit., p. 572. The main reference here is Eugene Kamenka, *The Ethical Foundation of Marxism* New York, 1962.

12. N. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, New York, Modern Library, 1940, p. 15, quoted by R. Bendix, *Max Weber—An Intellectual Portrait*, New York, Doubleday, 1960, p. 360.

13. E. E. Schatschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*, New York, Holt, 1966, pp. 116-17.

14. Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, New York, Norton, 1969, p. 102.

15. For a lengthy discussion of the concept and its history and fate in the Marxist literature, cf. Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1957, ch. 9.

16. This work was first published in Russia in 1939. It was translated into French by Roger Dangeville, as *Fondements de la critique de l'Economie Politique*, Paris, Anthrops, 1967. The reference is from Vol. 1, p. 437.

17. Ibid., p. 439.

18. Ibid.

19. This model is explicit in Engels' *The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State*. See the discussion in Wittfogel, op. cit., pp. 382 ff.

20. Behind this thesis is, among other things, the debate created by Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966. Previous relevant works that lead to the same notion include Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962, and R. Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry*, New York, John Wiley, 1956, which deals with the role of the state in the class relations of industrial society. For a broader reference, see Simon Schwartzman, "Desenvolvimento e Abertura Política," *Dados*, Vol. 6, 1969, 36-41.

21. R. Bendix, *Max Weber—An Intellectual Portrait*, New York, Doubleday, 1960, p. 360.

22. Ibid., p. 348.

23. Ibid., pp. 405-06.

24. Sergio Buarque de Holanda, ed, *História Geral da Civilização Brasileira*, Vol. I, São Paulo, Difusão Européia do Livro, 1960, p. 18 (my translation).

25. The main source for the analysis of Portuguese patrimonialism in Brazil is Raymundo Faoro, *Os Donos do Poder—Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro*, Porto Alegre, Editora Globo, 1958. For an overview of Spanish patrimonialism, see Magali Sarfatti, *Spanish Bureaucratic Patrimonialism in America*, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1966.

26. See Burns, *A History of Brazil*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, p. 24:

Those inalienable land grants transmitted by inheritance to the oldest son brought to the New World some of the residues of feudalism long on the wane in the Iberian peninsula.

27. Data recalculated from Herbert S. Klein, "The Colored Freedmen in Brazilian Society," *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1969, p. 50. The original source is the *Diretoria Geral de Estatística, Recenseamento Geral... de 1890, Distrito Federal, Rio de Janeiro, 1895*, p. 416-21.

28. Rio has traditionally been the place for popular mobilization on political issues. One of the most well-known examples is the abolitionist campaign in the late nineteenth century; another was the rebellion of the Rio population in 1904 against compulsory smallpox vaccination. Edgar Carone gives a good example both of public proximity and public impotence in political issues in a quotation from an eyewitness of the 1889 coup that established the Republic:

For the time being, the Government is purely military, and will remain this way. There's was the event, only theirs, because the cooperation of the civilian element was almost inexistant. The people followed all that stupified, surprised, without knowing what it meant. Many believed that it was a military parade. It was something worth seeing, the enthusiasm came later.

This extract is from a letter of Aristides Lobo, a newsman, quoted in Edgar Carone, *A Primeira República, São Paulo Difusão Europeia do Livro*, 1969, p. 288. (The translation is mine.)

29. Gideon Sjoberg, *The Preindustrial City*, New York, Free Press, 1960.

30. Oliver C. Cox, "The Preindustrial City Reconsidered," *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. V, 1964, p. 133-44.

31. Max Weber, *The City*, trans. and ed. by Don Martindale and G. Neuwith, New York, Free Press, 1958.

32. Vatro Murvaer, "Some Tentative Modifications of Weber's Typology: Occidental vs. Oriental City," *Social Forces*, Vol. 44, March 1966, pp. 381-89.

33. Classic references here are E. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, New York, Free Press, 1958, and Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, New York, Free Press, 1958. Implicit in Banfield's work is the assumption that, as people become less backward, their frame of reference expands from "amoral-familism" to "public regardiness." (The presence of public-regardiness in the North American upper strata was tested, quite unsuccessfully, in J. Q. Wilson and E. C. Banfield, "Public Regardiness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 58, No. 4, December 1964, pp. 876-87.) Lerner's relevance in the sociology of development also should not be minimized. According to Bendix, "the great merit of Lerner's study consists in its candid use of Western modernization as a model of global applicability" (R. Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," in *Embattled Reason*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 250).

34. For instance, see Lucien Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1962.

35. This process of economic decay and the mechanisms of adjustment are the subject of Antonio Barros de Castro, "A Herança Regional do Desenvolvimento Brasileiro," *Ensaio sobre a Economia Brasileira*, Vol. II, Rio de Janeiro, Forense, 1971. For an analysis of the economic mechanisms behind the growing inequalities between the Northeast and the Southwest of Brazil, see Nathaniel H. Leff, "Desenvolvimento Econômico e Desigualdade Regional: Origens do Caso Brasileiro," *Revista Brasileira de Economia*, Vol. 26, No. 1, January-March 1972.

36. In the 1872 census, 20.54 percent of the Brazilian population was concentrated in Minas Gerais, as against 13.89 percent in Bahia and 8.43 percent in

São Paulo. São Paulo takes the lead only in the 1940 census, with 17.4 percent of the population compared to 16.4 percent in Minas.

37. V. O. Key, *Southern Politics*, New York, Knopf, 1949, especially ch. 16, "Solidarity in the Senate."

38. For a review of this literature, see José Murilo de Carvalho, "Estudos de Poder Local no Brasil," *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos* (Belo Horizonte), No. 25-26, June 1968, pp. 231-48. Glaucio Soares, in a forthcoming book on the 1945-64 period, has shown in a typology of Brazilian grass-roots politics that the traditional coronel type of local politics is just one kind of local power, more typical of Minas Gerais than of São Paulo. Cf. Glaucio A. D. Soares, *A Democracia que Passou* mimeographed, Brasília, 1971.

39. The best theoretical interpretation of local politics in traditional Brazil is certainly Antonio Octavio Cintra, "A Integração do Processo Político no Brasil: Algumas Hipóteses Inspiradas na Literatura," *Revista de Administração Pública*, (Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Getúlio Vargas), Vol. 5, No. 2, 1971.

40.

But São Paulo's case, where the colonos and their descendants—white or mestiço—preferred the interior to the coast is, in any case, an exception. In the rest of Brazil, for a long time, the rule was to follow the classic settlement patterns of Portuguese colonizing activities which had been dictated by mercantile convenience and by the African and Asian experiences."

See Sergio Buarque de Holanda, *História Geral da Civilização Brasileira*, Vol. 1, pp. 129-30.

41. For a description of the Emboabas War against the Paulista explorers in Minas Gerais around 1700, see Holanda, *Ibid.*, pp. 297-369.

42. Actually, after 1932, Minas Gerais rebelled twice against the central government, once, through a "Manifesto dos Mineiros," against the Vargas dictatorship, and later with the government of Magalhães Pinto against João Goulart in 1964. In both cases, the central government was soon to be overthrown by the army. The São Paulo Governor, Adhemar de Barros, also threatened to set his state against Goulart in 1964; but this attempt was less consonant with the national civil-military movement, and his own political survival was not maintained. The differences in pattern are significant.

43. Juan Linz, "The Eight Spains," in L. Merritt and S. Rokkan, *Comparing Nations*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1966, p. 278 ff. See the tables comparing Brazil and Spain. Juan Linz gives some "soft" data that cannot easily be reproduced for Brazil. Alfred Stepan, nevertheless, makes an explicit parallel between Madrid-Barcelona and Rio-São Paulo when referring to the recruitment of cadets for Brazilian Military School. He shows that, in the 1964-66 period, São Paulo had 18.3 percent of the Brazilian population, but only 8.26 percent of the Army cadets, giving a ratio of about 5 to 10. The ratio for Rio de Janeiro was 90 to 10, and for Rio Grande do Sul, 19 to 10. The ratio for Rio Grande in an earlier period is much higher. Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 38.

44. A. F. Organski, "Fascism and Modernization," in S. D. Wolf (ed.), *The Nature of Fascism*, New York, Vintage Books, 1969, pp. 19-41.

45. The best study on Rio Grande do Sul's political history in the twentieth century is certainly Joseph L. Love's *Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1971. The Brazilian bibliography on the early

period is quite extensive. For a detailed account of the conflicts with the Spanish colonies since the establishment of the colonia de Sacramento, see Aléides Lima, *História Popular do Rio Grande do Sul*, Porto Alegre, O Globo, 1935.

46. Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building," op. cit.

47. Ibid.

48. For the relationships between the Rio Grande caudillos and the army, see Sylvio Romero, *O Castilhismo no Rio Grande do Sul*, Porto, 1912. J. Love gives a detailed account of the role of Rio Grande in the "military question," that eventually led to the fall of the empire. He also reproduces a photo of the guachos hitching their horses to the obelisk on Rio's Avenida Rio Branco on November 1, 1930.

49. For the economic role of Rio Grande as a supplier of the internal market, see the section headed "Extremo Sul-O precoce desenvolvimento Voltado para Dentro," in The Chapter entitled "A Herança Regional do Desenvolvimento Brasileiro," in Antonio Barros de Castro, *Ensaio sobre a Economia Brasileira*, Vol. II, Rio de Janeiro, Forense, 1971.

50. Cf. S. Schwartzman, "Veinte Años de Democracia Representativa en Brasil," op. cit.